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ABSTRACT: The paper is aimed to show that directly referring terms have to be 
rigid designators. Since directly referring expressions refer to something on the 
basis of semantic conventions alone and since the conventions are independent 
of possible worlds, there cannot be a directly referring expression with shifting 
reference across possible worlds. Although this claim seems to be indubitable and 
widely recognized, it was questioned recently. Drawing on D. Lewis’ ontology of 
counterparts, G. Martí has shown that a directly referring expression is capable 
to refer to different objects in different possible worlds. A directly referring term 
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other possible world. The paper tries to show that the purported directly referring 
terms assumed by Martí’s argument are not, in fact, directly referring.
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It is a platitude in current philosophy of language that some expressions 
are modally insensitive in the sense that their reference is constant across 
all possible worlds; such expressions are usually called rigid designa-
tors.1 Another platitude has it that some expressions refer to something 
without any conceptual mediation that would determine which objects are 
referred to by such phrases; expressions of this kind are usually labelled 
directly referring phrases. And the last platitude I wish to highlight is that 
the two features are closely related because every directly referring term 
has to be a rigid designator as well (though the converse does not hold). 
The present paper aims to show that the last platitude is highly plausible 
because (i) there is a conceptual dependence between the two notions 
1 The terms “reference” and “designation” (and their derived forms) are used inter-
changeably throughout the paper.
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and (ii) a recent criticism apparently undermining this platitude can be 
refused.
The structure of the paper is as follows: I start with the definitions of 
rigid designation and direct reference (Section 1). Section 2 contains some 
preliminaries relevant for the argument given in Section 3. The argument 
demonstrates that if an expression is a device of direct reference, it cannot 
but be a rigid designator. However, this argument seems to be overridden 
by a recent challenge according to which directly referring terms can be 
non-rigid under certain conditions. The challenge is outlined in Section 
4. In Section 5, I try to show that it misses its point. More precisely, it is 
demonstrated that no directly referring term can be non-rigid despite the 
fact that the ontology backing up the challenge is adopted.
1. Rigid Designation and Direct Reference
Let us start with the precise definitions of the two notions mentioned 
above:
Given that L is a language, e is an expression (in L) and o is an object, 
e rigidly refers to o in L provided e refers to o in all possible worlds 
in which e refers to anything at all.
Given that L is a language, e is an expression (in L) and o is an object, 
e directly refers to o in L provided there is no conceptual mediation, 
m, between e and o such that m determines e’s reference to o.
Concerning rigidity, various definitions are available in the literature. The 
definition given above is my preferred one because it is silent about the ex-
istence of objects designated. As far as I am aware of, it was suggested by 
Hilary Putnam for the first time (see Putnam 1975: 231). Putnam ascribes 
it to Saul Kripke, but Kripke’s official definition claims that an expression 
is a rigid designator if it refers to the same individual in all possible worlds 
in which the individual exists (see Kripke 1980: 48–49; Kripke 1993: 172). 
Although it might seem that my definition is just an alternative formula-
tion of the idea encapsulated in Kripke’s, they lead, in fact, to different 
predictions. Observe that expressions such as “the individual who both 
authored The Republic and is identical with Plato” are rigid in Putnamian 
sense but non-rigid in Kripke’s sense. The reason is that there are possible 
worlds in which Plato exists without being the author of The Republic; in 
such worlds, the description “the individual who both authored The Re-
public and is identical with Plato” fails to refer to Plato (in fact, it fails to 
refer to anyone else too). Since the description does not refer to anything 
in such worlds and, in other worlds, it refers to Plato and nothing else, it is 
a rigid designator according to the Putnamian definition, but it cannot be 
89M. ZOUHAR: Are There Directly Referring Non-Rigid Designators?
rigid for Kripke because there are worlds in which the description refers 
to nothing, despite Plato’s existence in these worlds. Does it mean that the 
description “the individual who both authored The Republic and is identi-
cal with Plato” is non-rigid for Kripke? Well, it should not be such because 
it does not refer to different individuals in different possible worlds. So, 
given Kripke’s definition, it is neither rigid nor non-rigid and this implies 
that Kripke’s notion is not general enough.2
Concerning direct reference, there are also different notions to be 
found in the literature. According to one of them, an expression is a device 
of direct reference provided its reference is not mediated by any concep-
tual content (cf., for example, Marcus 1993a: 11 or 1993b: 203, 212); ac-
cording to another notion, proposed in particular by David Kaplan (see 
Kaplan 1989), an expression is directly referring provided the object des-
ignated is everything the expression contributes into the proposition ex-
pressed by the sentences involving the expression.3 Kaplan has shown that 
the two notions differ in the case of demonstratives and other indexicals 
– they are directly referring in the latter sense without being such in the 
former sense. For there is some conceptual mediator expressed by an in-
dexical determining which entity is designated by a particular utterance of 
it; on the other hand, the entity referred to by the indexical is everything it 
contributes into the propositions expressed. However, concerning proper 
names, these two notions make no difference because a name both refers 
to something without any conceptual mediation and its referent is every-
thing it contributes into the propositions expressed.4
Both notions defined above bear some implications for truth condi-
tions. Let F(a) be a sentence and a be a term. (i) If a is directly referring, 
F(a) is evaluated as true or false, in a given possible world, with respect 
to the object designated by a. (ii) If a is rigid, F(a) is evaluated as true or 
false with respect to the same individual in all possible worlds in which 
a designates something. Consider the sentence “Plato is wise”. It is Plato 
himself – rather than descriptive conditions such as being the tutor of 
Aristotle or being the author of The Republic – who enters the truth con-
ditions of “Plato is wise” in particular possible worlds; similarly, it is 
Plato himself – rather than anyone else – who enters the truth conditions 
of the sentence in all possible worlds (in which “Plato” refers to anything 
at all).
2 Further details about the two notions of rigidity, i.e., Putnam’s and Kripke’s, can be 
found in Zouhar (2011).
3 For further details see also Martí (1995); (2003).
4 Anyway, since the challenge to be discussed in Sections 3 and 4 is based on the 
former notion, I stick to it.
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2. Baptism and Semantic Conventions
Suppose R is the set of all rigid designators (in English, say) and D is the 
set of all directly referring expressions (in the same language). Now it is 
commonly agreed that R is not identical with D because some expressions 
are members of R without being members of D. On the other hand, all 
members of D are usually supposed to be the members of R as well. Thus, 
D is a proper subset of R; i.e., for every directly referring expression it 
holds that it must be a rigid designator, but not vice versa. This is what I 
call the Standard View.5 Since the Standard View has it that directly refer-
ring expressions are rigid designators by necessity, there is supposed to 
be a (one-way) conceptual dependence between direct reference and rigid 
designation. No doubt, the Standard View has considerable intuitive and 
philosophical appeal.
There is a simple and straightforward argument supporting the Stand-
ard View. Before embarking on details of the argument, some general con-
siderations concerning naming individuals and introducing expressions 
into language might be useful.
The reference of proper names is fixed by the so-called baptisms. 
Baptisms are (idealized) acts designed to ascribe names to objects. They 
can be circumscribed in this simple (and maybe simplistic) manner:
Given that there is an object to be named, o, an expression to be attached 
to the object, e, and another device, d, identifying o for the baptizer, b 
(d might be another expression already referring to o, or a pointing ges-
ture towards o, or anything else that enables b to identify o), b decides 
that o identified for her by d shall be henceforth named e.
Baptisms can be taken also as acts introducing new proper names into 
language. Naming objects and introducing proper names into language are 
just two sides of the same coin. To introduce an expression into language 
is to say what it means in that language. Therefore, baptisms can be taken 
as establishing semantic conventions for new expressions. The semantic 
convention established in this way is a relation between an expression, e, 
an object, o, and language, L, such that e refers to o in L on the basis of 
the semantic convention and irrespective of anything else. The convention 
can be thus represented as an ordered couple 〈e, o〉
L
, where the subscript L 
suggests that the convention is relativized to L.
The semantic conventions established by baptisms are essential to 
expressions qua expressions of a given language. In particular, the se-
mantic convention, c, for an expression, e, is a distinctive mark that is 
5 The Standard View is defended by a number of philosophers; cf., for example, 
Salmon (1986) or Soames (2002); (2005).
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essential to e’s identity. Suppose an act of baptism establishes a semantic 
convention, c, for an expression, e, to the effect that e refers to an object, 
o, on the basis of c. Imagine also another baptism establishing another 
semantic convention, c*, assigning an expression to another object, o*. 
Since e was introduced into the language as an expression referring to o, 
c* ascribes o* to another expression, e*, even though e* might be pho-
netically and orthographically indistinguishable from e. In other words, 
since semantic conventions are essential to the identity of expressions 
(as expressions of a given language), different conventions go with dif-
ferent expressions.6
3. Semantic Conventions, Direct Reference, 
and Rigid Designation
Now I am ready to present the argument for the Standard View advertised 
above: Since (i) the referent of a directly referring expression (in the sense 
defined above) is conventionally selected, (ii) the semantic convention de-
termining what an expression means holds for all possible worlds without 
exception, and (iii) variable (i.e., non-rigid) reference of an expression is 
dependent (also) on how things are in particular possible worlds, an ex-
pression cannot refer to different individuals in different possible worlds 
on the basis of one and the same semantic convention alone. Such an ex-
pression is rigid, if directly referring.
Let us look at point (i) more closely. It is easy to see that if an expres-
sion, e, refers to a particular object, o, it has to be determined somehow 
that e refers to o rather than to any other object. If e is a directly referring 
expression, it has no conceptual content that might serve as a reference 
fixing mediator. And since the reference of e cannot be established by such 
a mediator, there is just a conventional assignment available as a guaran-
tee that e refers to o. Thus, to say that e refers to o merely on the basis of 
a semantic convention established by an act of baptism, is tantamount to 
6 If someone finds this idea problematic, s/he is invited to consider a more moderate 
thesis. We might admit that there is but one expression, e’, instead of e and e*, and that e’ 
is associated with two semantic conventions, c and c*. Even in this case, it is important 





(subscripts hint at what e’ means in a given use). The talk of e and e* as being different 
expressions is, as far as I can see, tantamount to saying that e’ can have two different mean-
ings. The reason is that e and e* can be meaningfully described either as directly/indirectly 
referring or as rigid/non-rigid, but e’ is not the proper kind of expression which might be 





. Anyway, the former way of putting things I find more comfortable. 
But whatever can be said in the former way can be translated, without any loss, into the 
latter one.
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saying that e refers to o directly.7 Directly referring expressions refer to 
something on the basis of their semantic conventions alone and irrespec-
tive of anything else.8
Next, turn to point (ii). Semantic conventions are introduced to hold 
for all possible worlds indiscriminately and regardless of how things are 
in those worlds. If semantic conventions were bound to particular possi-
ble worlds, different conventions might be possible for different worlds. 
However, to say there are different sets of semantic conventions for differ-
ent sets of possible worlds is tantamount to saying that different languages 
are used to describe those worlds. Therefore, if the same language can be 
used to describe all possible worlds without exception, the same semantic 
conventions have to hold for them. Of course, the same language can be 
used to describe all possible worlds without exception. In other words, 
if there is a world which is not describable in our language, it cannot be 
possible for us. Thus, the very notion of a possible world guarantees that 
point (ii) holds.
Finally, turn to point (iii). Given that possible worlds are distributions 
of properties over individuals, one and the same individual may possess 
various properties in different possible worlds. Some of these properties 
are empirical in the sense that an individual exemplifies them in some 
possible worlds and fails to exemplify them in others. Let us say that an 
empirical property, P, is referentially effective for an expression, e, pro-
vided e refers to an object, o, in all possible worlds in which o has P and e 
fails to refer to o in all those worlds in which o does not have P. If o loses 
any of those properties that are referentially effective for e, e does not refer 
to o anymore. If a property, P*, is not referentially effective for e, P* is 
referentially idle for e. If o loses any of those properties that are referen-
tially idle for e, e might still refer to o. Now, since the semantic conven-
7 The position defended by Michael Pendlebury is particularly interesting for the 
present paper (see Pendlebury 1990). He demonstrated that proper names are rigid designa-
tors because they are arbitrary signs. Arbitrariness of proper names is, from my viewpoint, 
justified by conventional assignment. An expression is an arbitrary sign for an object if it 
designates the object by fiat, i.e., if the object need not satisfy any other condition which 
would establish the connection between the expression and the object. Since conventional 
assignment is the very essence of direct reference, it might be claimed that what Pend-
lebury demonstrated was in fact the idea that there is a conceptual connection between 
rigidity and direct reference.
8 An indirectly referring expression refers to an object also on the basis of some other 
things. For example, the semantic conventions of a definite description (together with 
compositionality) guarantee that it expresses a particular conceptual content; however, an 
object has to exemplify uniquely a particular property to become its referent. Therefore, 
an indirectly referring term refers to something on the basis of its semantic conventions 
together with certain extra-linguistic facts such as the state of affairs.
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tions determining what a given expression refers to hold for all possible 
worlds, i.e., regardless of any empirical properties the objects designated 
might exemplify, all empirical properties have to be referentially idle for 
that expression. As a result, no property is referentially effective for it 
and there is no way to change its reference across possible worlds. Thus, 
if an expression refers to something on the basis of its semantic conven-
tion alone and irrespective of any properties the object designated might 
exemplify, i.e., directly, its reference cannot vary across different possible 
worlds. On the other hand, if an expression refers to different individuals 
in different possible worlds, there has to be a property that is referentially 
effective for the expression. Therefore, variable reference is incompatible 
with conventionally determined reference.
To sum up: Variable reference cannot be warranted exclusively by 
the semantic conventions associated with expressions. Since direct refer-
ence is conventionally warranted, it is incompatible with variable refer-
ence. Hence, if an expression is directly referring, its reference cannot 
vary across different possible worlds. Therefore, an expression has to be 
rigid, if directly referring.
4. Against the Standard View
Given the above argument, it seems to be a genuine truism that if a term 
is a directly referring expression, it cannot but be rigid. This is what the 
Standard View claims. However, Genoveva Martí came up recently with 
a challenge to this view (see Martí 2003). It rests on the idea that it is pos-
sible to devise an expression that is both directly referring and non-rigid. 
The gist of the challenge consists, so far as I can see, in that the intuitive 
appeal of the Standard View is primarily derived from our metaphysi-
cal preoccupations rather than from the supposed conceptual relationship 
between the notion of rigidity and that of direct reference. For our notion 
of individual as existing across possible worlds seems to be essential to 
the Standard View. Given this notion of individual, it is easy to infer that 
directly referring phrases must be rigid designators. Now if this notion 
of individual is given up, the Standard View might be in serious danger. 
Martí’s challenge deliberately assumes a notion of individual that deviates 
from our household one. She tries to show that if the identity relation be-
tween individuals across possible worlds is replaced by a sort of similarity 
relation between individuals from diverse worlds, the seeming conceptual 
relationship between the notions of rigid designation and direct reference 
disappears. Hence, if there is a linguistic convention assigning an object 
to an expression and if the expression refers, in any possible world, to 
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something that is not identical with this object but merely resembles it in 
certain respects, then the expression is non-rigid.9
One is, perhaps, allowed to work with various similarity relations. 
What should be preserved, however, is that the relation is good enough to 
replace the identity relation between objects across possible worlds and 
that ontology based on such a relation makes it impossible for one and the 
same object to exist in more than one possible world. Martí works with 
David Lewis’s counterpart ontology (see Lewis 1983 or 1986). Accord-
ing to his theory, an object exists only in one possible world and in other 
worlds there are, instead, counterparts of the object.10 Given that o is an 
object existing in a possible world, w, another object, o*, from another 
possible world, w*, is its counterpart (in w*) provided o* is similar to o 
more than any other object from w*.11
Now Martí presents the following reason against the Standard 
View:12
Consider, for instance, a Millian who accepts some of the fundamental ideas 
that inspire David Lewis’s metaphysics… This Millian argues that “Hespe-
rus” is not rigid: when someone utters “Hesperus is bright” the individuals 
relevant for the evaluation of what is said on that occasion of use are, strictly 
speaking, different in different possible worlds; which objects are relevant 
depends on the connection that make one object a counterpart of some other 
object. (Martí 2003: 169)
The argument lurking behind this quote can be summed up as follows. Let 
an object, o, exists in one possible world, w, only and in other possible 
worlds there are counterparts of o instead of o itself; let o be designated 
in w by a and F(a) be a sentence. Assume that a is a directly referring 
 9 As Martí stressed out, identity across possible worlds is essential to the notion of 
rigidity and if identity is replaced by a sort of similarity relation, we are left with a different 
notion, “no matter how similar to rigidity it is” (Martí 2003: 169).
10 It is impossible for one and the same object to exist in more than one world be-
cause, as a matter of definition, the object is a part of the possible world and worlds are 
disconnected. Therefore, an object existing in one world cannot be a part of any other 
world. It is to be pointed out also that there is not just one counterpart relation. This fact has 
been showed, for example, by Allen Hazen (cf. Hazen 1979) and confirmed also by Lewis 
himself in Postscript to Lewis (1983).
11 I shall remain neutral as to which properties of objects and their counterparts are 
to be taken as decisive in establishing similarity between them. Some authors have argued 
that the condition placed on the counterpart relation given in the main text is misguided. 
For it is possible to devise situations in which it is better to take another object, o**, as 
o’s counterpart even though o* resembles o more than o** does. For details see Feldman 
(1971) or Hazen (1979).
12 The Millian mentioned in the quote is a philosopher who embraces the notion of 
direct reference defined in Section 1.
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expression. If a is directly referring, it contributes just o into the truth con-
ditions of F(a) in w. If w* is a possible world such that w* ≠ w and there 
is a counterpart of o in w*, the truth conditions of F(a) in w* involve the 
counterpart of o in w* rather than o itself. Thus, as a directly refers to o 
in w, so it directly refers to o’s counterpart in w*. Since different objects 
are relevant for the evaluation of F(a) in w and w*, a is non-rigid. Conse-
quently, a is both directly referring and non-rigid.
By way of illustration, consider Martí’s sentence, (1); its truth condi-
tions can be put forth as (2):
(1) Hesperus is bright.
(2) The sentence “Hesperus is bright” is true in w iff either (i) Hes-
perus is bright in w, provided w is the actual world, or (ii) the 
counterpart of Hesperus in w is bright in w, provided w is a non-
actual world.
Various objects that are counterparts of Hesperus in different possible 
worlds enter the truth conditions of (1) in those worlds. Alternatively it 
can be said that “Hesperus” refers to diverse objects in different possible 
worlds. It is thus non-rigid. At the same time, “Hesperus” is supposed to 
be a directly referring term because it just names Hesperus without any 
conceptual mediation. Hence, it is both directly referring and non-rigid.
The argument is powerful and convincing. If its premises are true, its 
conclusion has to be true as well. Thus, it presents a real challenge to the 
Standard View. In what follows I try to show that, despite appearances, 
the friend of counterparts need not claim that there are directly referring 
non-rigid designators.
5. The Standard View Defended
Admit, for the sake of argument, that different objects enter the truth con-
ditions of (1) in different possible worlds. But if this is so, it is easy to 
see that the reference of “Hesperus” cannot be direct. For it has to be 
guaranteed that “Hesperus” contributes Hesperus into the truth condi-
tions of (1) in our world and its counterparts in other possible worlds. It 
should be stipulated somehow that “Hesperus” behaves in this way rather 
than in any other way. There has to be some rule or other associated with 
“Hesperus” according to which it behaves differently in different possible 
worlds. To stipulate that “Hesperus” behaves in this way is tantamount to 
saying that there is such a rule. The rule has to determine that “Hesperus” 
contributes Hesperus into the truth conditions of sentences in which it oc-
curs, if uttered with respect to the actual world, and that it contributes the 
counterparts of Hesperus into the truth conditions of sentences in which it 
occurs, if uttered with respect to non-actual worlds.
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What might happen if there were not such a rule associated with 
“Hesperus”? It seems plausible to me that in non-actual worlds, in which 
Hesperus does not exist, “Hesperus” might contribute nothing into the 
truth conditions of sentences in which it occurs. So we have to guarantee 
somehow that the name contributes something into the truth conditions in 
those worlds in which the counterparts of Hesperus exist instead of Hes-
perus itself. So, to exclude this possibility, it is necessary to associate with 
the name a rule selecting the counterparts of Hesperus as truth-conditional 
constituents. Now, if this is admitted, the rule has to be taken as a mediator 
between “Hesperus” and what it designates in different possible worlds. 
The reference relation between “Hesperus” and what it designates is not 
direct anymore. Thus, if “Hesperus” is supposed to contribute the coun-
terparts of Hesperus into the truth conditions of sentences in non-actual 
worlds, it cannot do so without any conceptual or semantic mediation. If 
this line of reasoning is correct, then “Hesperus” is both a non-rigid desig-
nator and an indirectly referring term.
The same conclusion can be justified also for other reasons. “Hes-
perus” is supposed to be a directly referring term in the sense introduced 
above. Thus, there is a semantic convention which attaches “Hesperus” to 
Hesperus. Now, if Martí’s argument has it that “Hesperus” should be non-
rigid, provided the counterpart ontology is adopted, “Hesperus” should 
be capable to refer to the counterparts of our Hesperus on the very same 
semantic convention (and regardless of anything else).13 As we have seen, 
such semantic conventions are established by baptisms. If everything is 
done properly, the result is a semantic convention that can be represented 
(in a somewhat simplified manner) as the ordered couple 〈“Hesperus”, 
Hesperus〉 in which the first member is the name and the second one the 
object named. Now if this is the case, “Hesperus” may contribute just 
Hesperus itself and nothing else into the truth conditions of the sentences 
in which it occurs. Suppose someone wants to evaluate (1) in a non-actual 
world in which there is a counterpart of Hesperus instead of Hesperus it-
self. Given the above semantic convention, “Hesperus” cannot contribute 
anything into the truth conditions of the sentence in such a world. It cannot 
contribute the counterpart of Hesperus because the semantic convention in 
question is completely silent about its counterparts.
13 The qualification “on the very same semantic convention” is essential. For it war-
rants the same language is under discussion. Recall that the argument developed in Section 
3 has been based on the idea that, if the same language is under discussion and an expres-
sion refers to something on the basis of a semantic convention alone, the expression has 
to be rigid. Martí’s argument is not aimed to show that the expression is non-rigid because 
the semantic convention has been replaced by another one.
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Thus, if it is to be guaranteed that, on the very same semantic con-
vention, “Hesperus” contributes different objects in different possible 
worlds into the truth conditions of the sentences in which it appears, the 
semantic convention has to be shaped differently. Instead of 〈“Hesperus”, 
Hesperus〉, the semantic convention might be represented as the couple 
〈“Hesperus”, R〉, where R is the rule which claims that “Hesperus” refers 
to Hesperus in the actual world and to its counterparts in those worlds in 
which it has some. However, this is tantamount to saying that “Hesperus” 
is not directly referring.
Consequently, given the ontology of counterparts, “Hesperus” can be 
construed as a non-rigid designator. However, it cannot be treated as a 
directly referring term because its reference has to be mediated somehow. 
We may conclude that if “Hesperus” is taken as a non-rigid designator, 
then it is an indirectly referring term.
A parallel argument shows that if “Hesperus” is supposed to be a di-
rectly referring term, then it cannot but be a rigid designator. Assume that 
“Hesperus” refers to Hesperus conventionally and irrespective of anything 
else, as required by the direct reference view. Again, the convention can be 
represented as 〈“Hesperus”, Hesperus〉. Whenever “Hesperus” is uttered 
in the actual world it contributes Hesperus into the truth conditions of the 
sentences in which it occurs. And since Hesperus fails to exist in non-ac-
tual worlds, the name cannot contribute it into the truth conditions in such 
worlds. Now the semantic convention is completely silent about the fact 
that, in non-actual worlds, the name should contribute counterparts of Hes-
perus rather than Hesperus itself into the truth conditions. It may happen 
that “Hesperus” contributes nothing into the truth conditions in non-actual 
worlds. “Hesperus” can be taken as referring to nothing in the Hesperus-
free worlds, while in those worlds in which Hesperus does exist it refers to 
it. Therefore, “Hesperus” is a rigid designator despite the fact that it refers 
to something just in one possible world, namely the actual world. Anyway, 
if “Hesperus” refers directly, then it refers rigidly as well.
Now it can be objected that the above line of reasoning makes it im-
possible to use “Hesperus” in describing counterfactual circumstances. 
It would be impossible to evaluate sentences such as (1) in non-actual 
worlds because there would be nothing in those worlds with respect to 
which such sentences could be either true or false. This objection, though 
correct, is utterly irrelevant, however. It is true that sentences such as (1) 
can be either true or false even in non-actual possible worlds. Therefore, 
there has to be something “Hesperus” and other names contribute into 
the truth conditions of sentences involving them in such worlds. Anyway, 
this fact cannot be used as evidence against my argument. It just suggests 
that “Hesperus” contributes something into the truth conditions also in 
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Hesperus-free worlds provided there are suitable counterparts of Hespe-
rus in those worlds. The objection can be thus taken as a plea for taking 
“Hesperus” as non-rigid. Now in that case, the first part of my argument 
comes to the fore and forbids portraying “Hesperus” as directly referring. 
So, the objection comes to the following: Since “Hesperus” can be used 
to describe counterfactual circumstances and has to be non-rigid provided 
the ontology of counterparts is adopted, it cannot be taken as directly re-
ferring either.
There seems to be also another option available.14 Despite the fact 
that its reference is mediated by a rule R, “Hesperus” can be portrayed as 
directly referring in the Kaplanian sense mentioned in Section 1. It might 
be claimed both that “Hesperus” contributes nothing but Hesperus into the 
truth conditions of sentences in which it occurs and that it refers to Hes-
perus on the basis of a rule R. In this manner, “Hesperus” might resemble 
ordinary indexicals. If “Hesperus” is directly referring in this sense, it is 
non-rigid because the rule R may select different individuals (those that 
are counterparts of our Hesperus) in different possible worlds as propo-
sitional contributions of “Hesperus”.15 Anyway, this possibility cannot be 
treated as justifying Martí’s argument because she explicitly adopted, in 
her argument, the other notion of direct reference, namely the one that is 
based on unmediated reference.
So, leaving this option aside, my conclusion is that “Hesperus” is 
either an indirectly referring non-rigid designator or a directly referring 
rigid designator. In any case, it need not be a directly referring non-rigid 
designator as demanded by Martí’s argument.
This conclusion is stronger than the one reached by A. Sullivan in his 
criticism of Martí’s argument. He has pointed out that
[a]n expression is a non-rigid designator only if (holding linguistic con-
ventions fixed) what it designates from world to world varies according to 
contingent matters of fact…, and only a designator whose designatum (at a 
context) is determined via some sort of semantic mediator could possibly 
satisfy this condition. (Sullivan 2005: 585–586)
Thus, despite the ontology of counterparts, proper names need not be 
taken as non-rigid designators because what a name designates in different 
possible worlds does not vary “according to contingent matters of fact”. 
14 I am indebted to an anonymous referee here.
15 Of course, “Hesperus” resembles indexicals in a very modest manner. For indexi-
cals – or, better their utterances – are usually treated as rigid designators. An utterance of 
an indexical is rigid because it cannot but refer to the same individual to which it actually 
refers; the utterance cannot change its reference once it has been determined in a given 
context of use.
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Directly referring expressions, though not rigid in the standard sense, are 
not non-rigid either; they are quasi-rigid. A designator is quasi-rigid if it 
refers, in all possible worlds in which it refers to something, only to those 
objects that are counterparts of the one designated in our world (cf. also 
Lewis 1986: 256). So, according to Sullivan, there cannot be directly re-
ferring non-rigid designators. Anyway, he admits that a directly referring 
phrase may refer to different objects in diverse possible worlds (provided 
the objects are in the counterpart relation to the one designated by the 
expression in the actual world). In other words, he is willing to admit the 
category of directly referring quasi-rigid designators instead of Martí’s 
directly referring non-rigid designators.
How should we evaluate Sullivan’s reasoning? Well, we may admit 
that some expressions are quasi-rigid designators in the sense outlined 
above. But we have seen that such expressions cannot refer directly. What 
a non-rigid designator refers to, “varies according to contingent matters of 
fact”; what a quasi-rigid designators refers to, varies according to linguis-
tic matters of fact. Anyway, in both cases there is something interfering in 
the reference relation. So the two sorts of designators have something in 
common – they are not capable to refer directly. Quasi-rigid designators 
are neither rigid nor directly referring.
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